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[In the course of more than forty years, Mark Elvin has worked on a range of 
themes. These have included the earliest local democratic  institutions in modern 
China, the long-term economic growth of China  from early imperial times to the 
end of the empire, aspects of Chinese  women‟s history and the computer model-
ling of the population dynamics in Jiangnan during Qing times, the long-term 
historical geography of China, and, following this, the long-term environmental 
history of China down to the end of the nineteenth century. At all times he has 
had a continuous interest in the history of premodern Chinese science and tech-
nology as these interwove with the economy and the  environment. His particu-
lar personal focus has however been on premodern Chinese efforts at probabilistic 
thinking. His especial  academic self-indulgence has perhaps been an inability to 
resist the temptation to make translations of old Chinese poems, often about 
everyday life, to illustrate Chinese social, intellectual, and  environmental  histo-
ry. He has also done fieldwork in western Yunnan, western Anhui, and the 
Hangzhou Bay area. Having retired about three years ago, he has shifted to look-
ing at aspects of plant science in late seventeenth-century Europe, with a per-
spective informed by comparisons with China at broadly the same time, torment-
ing himself linguistically with Baroque Latin rather than literary Chinese.]. 
 
Geoffrey Lloyd is exceptional in having both a linguistic and analytical 
mastery of the classics of western antiquity and a lately acquired, but 
serious, grasp of classical Chinese and the important classical Chinese 
works down to the end of the Han. He has been one of the first to travel 
the difficult double road that most comparativists are going to have to 
steel themselves to follow in the future. 
Delusions of Invulnerability is a loosely-linked set of six essays on  indi-
vidual topics of  socio-intellectual history treated in terms  of contrasts 
between ancient Greece and ancient China. The identification of these 
guiding themes is in itself a useful initial contribution to our thinking 
about the subject. Each chapter also ends with a mildly homiletic coda, 
suggesting lessons that the modern Western world might draw from the 
ideas presented. 
The first topic is the pluralism of philosophic traditions. Lloyd sees 
this as common to both ancient Greece and ancient China, though with 
an important difference: the ancient Chinese did not debate the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of different political structures. While this is 
probably true, he should have added that the Chinese in this period did 
discuss possible differences in particular institutions and  policies. The 
statesman Zichan 子 產 (died 522 BC) of the state of Zheng, an immediate 
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predecessor of Confucius, was once asked if he favoured putting an end 
to the xiangxiao 鄉 校, institutions that functioned both as local schools 
and a community meeting-places where participants came to take their 
leisure, and talk in critical terms about state policy. He replied that, to the 
contrary, he followed the views of these people, regarding them as his 
―teachers‖ in keeping people contented. He then used a hydraulic meta-
phor: major breaches of dykes were uncontrollable and disastrous, 
whereas opening  small breaks in this fashion let one make a controllable 
course for the water (Zuozhuan 左 傳, Xianggong 31). Another example 
was whether laws should be publicly available in written form, which 
Confucius disliked as not being in the spirit of ritual behaviour, or, as we 
might say, too mechanistic (as mentioned on pages 133 and 136). Nor 
does Lloyd explore the fact that at this period the Chinese ‗alternative‘ to 
what was widely accepted as the only possible basic structure of gov-
ernment was, in effect, an absence of government, as in the idealized pre-
political natural world of the Huainanzi. A partially comparable Buddhist 
variation, leading to a major controversy that arose not long after the 
end-point of Lloyd‘s time-frame, was the view of Chinese  Buddhists like 
Huiyuan 慧 遠 (334-416) that ―a monk does not bow before a king‖ 
shamen bu jing wang 沙 門 不 敬 王 (discussed by Zürcher in The Buddhist 
Conquest of China (1959), pp. 106ff, 231-239). Essentially, it was claimed 
that, though respectful towards secular power, the monk belonged to an 
intrinsically different world. By the Tang, though, the notion of an an-
thropogenic  political system (zhi 制) as an entity distinct from some sort 
of nature on the one hand, and from specific policies, good or bad, on the 
other, had emerged. The best-known example of this is the short essay 
Fengjian lun 封 建 論 (On ‗feudalism‘) by Liu Zongyuan 柳 宗 元 (773-819) 
in which he argues for the greater inherent stability of a meritocratic bu-
reaucratic structure as opposed to the hereditary ‗feudal‘ structure of pre-
Qin times. The presence of  implicit pro and contra argument is apparent 
from how he deals with important possible objections, which he intro-
duces (as did Wang Chong much earlier) with the phrase huozhe yue  或 
者 曰… ―someone may say:… ‖. That this falls outside the author‘s select-
ed time-frame shows there is a certain danger in the reader drawing im-
pressions that, while relatively sound for the period identified, may be 
significantly incomplete for Chinese imperial history as a whole. 
At times, Lloyd seems to set his readers challenges. In this first chap-
ter, after pointing out that in neither culture in ancient times was there 
was an agreed conception of what ‗philosophy‘ was, and no clear single 
term for it, the reader is left to ponder how one might—as a descriptive 
historian—usefully define something like ‗the practice of philosophy‘? It 
appears to me that one could get by to a first approximation with some-
thing like: ―a concern with conceptually exploring whether or not there is 
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an intellectual reason for changing one‘s mind on a general as opposed to a 
specific matter of interest, either on the basis of new arguments, or of 
new information, or both.‖ Though hazy at the edges, as highlighted by a 
residual imprecision in the words italicized, this formulation would seem 
to exclude divine   revelation, the uncritical following of human authority, 
and experimental science, while including most of what matters. At a sort 
of conceptual right angle lies the concern with how effectively to change 
other people‘s minds, in other words ‗rhetoric‘. Lloyd, perhaps in a way 
wisely, does not follow up problems such as this. 
The second topic is how learned elites were recruited, trained, and 
controlled. Here, exceptionally, and usefully, Lloyd for a moment intro-
duces a third dimension of intersocietal comparison. This is Mesopotamia 
prior to the full crystallization of the classical Greek and classical Chinese 
worlds. He shows that the Mesopotamian semi-hereditary, scholarly 
intellectual-professional stratum that emerged, consisting mainly but not 
entirely of officials linked to the mastery of canonical texts, was in many 
ways closer to the  Chinese than the Greeks. In both ancient Mesopotamia 
and ancient China, the function of the divination of the fortunes of the 
rulers and of their polity was, for example, of major importance. This is 
an area, though, where some reference to more general sociological-
historical works would have been valuable as context. Examples that 
come to mind are Randall Collins‘ The Sociology of Philosophies (1998) or 
parts of Shmuel Eisenstadt‘s The Political Systems of Empires (1963), which 
is surprisingly good on China. The Greeks, especially of the polis period, 
Lloyd argues, were historically unusual both in their relatively socially 
open recruitment, and in their high degree of reliance on the support of 
relatively popular audiences and private persons like students, as op-
posed to government or aristocratic patronage. I think we must agree 
with him here. 
The coda on our own times deals mostly with the problem of what we 
might term ‗establishment‘ opposition to new ideas. Here his general 
assertion that breakthroughs made in works like graduate dissertations 
can often be unreasonably resisted by examiners affronted by the demoli-
tion of their own ideas tallies, sadly, with my own close observance of, 
and involvement in, one (now late) friend‘s doctoral work in mathemati-
cally based experimental psychology. But another specific case of alleged 
establishment resistance he raises, that to the idea of plate tectonics, 
seems to me likely to be at least partly wrong. I knew its principal creator, 
the late Drum Matthews (working with Fred Vine), well. He was in my 
own college and, for a time I went climbing with him, and we talked 
about it. My memory is that once a technical struggle with the underwa-
ter magnetometer produced records that clearly showed the multiple 
‗mirrored‘ bands of reversing thermoremanent magnetism on either side 
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of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, making the case was in scientific terms a 
pushover, or at least among the local scientific community. I recall when 
he first showed them to me, I said ―So Wegener wins after all?‖ All he 
did at that point was give a momentary grin. It was obvious. Now, I 
would not claim to know the whole story, but I mention these points to 
show that when the book moves away from the tightly controlled analy-
sis of ancient thought, there is a risk that some statements in the codas 
are not comparably solidly based, and so at times open to challenge. 
The third chapter is on ―Audiences and Assemblies,‖ a subject famil-
iar to students of Western antiquity but little studied with respect to an-
cient China. Lloyd argues that the vigorous debates in Greek city-state 
assemblies and law-courts were models that strongly influenced the style 
of other domains of intellectual activity, and I think most scholars would 
agree with this. On the other hand, his treatment of this important topic 
in ancient China tends to convey the impression that most significant 
exchanges were those between two individuals, often a superior and an 
inferior, or within small restricted groups like a master and his disciples. 
While this contrast captures a significant part of the truth, and, as Lloyd 
correctly points out, superiors normally retained an absolute right as 
regards deciding what action should be taken as a result of discussions, 
his pages on this topic say nothing about such major events as the occa-
sional imperially convened conferences of scholars from all over the em-
pire to debate matters of both ideological and practical significance. The 
two most famous examples were the meeting called to debate state mo-
nopolies, and a range of other policies, between ministers and Confucians 
in 81 BC, recorded in The Discussions on Salt and Iron (Yantielun 鹽 鐵 論), 
and that in 79 AD between Confucian scholars arguing over cosmology, 
human nature and proper human behaviour, and the Confucian Classics, 
usually referred to as The Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall 
(Baihu tong 白 虎 通). Our records are too close to the nature of the for-
mally approved minutes for us to reconstruct with certainty the real style 
of the debates, both the live contributions and the responses of the audi-
ence. I would nonetheless have liked to hear what he has to say on the 
socio-intellectual character of these occasions. Overall, though, Lloyd‘s 
singling out of this topic as needing deeper thought deserves a warm 
welcome.  
As an addendum we may note that in both cultures the writing of let-
ters, though not mentioned in this chapter, which tends to privilege oral 
interpersonal communication (pp. 72-73), could play a key role, though in 
ancient times perhaps more so in the Greek-speaking world. Archimedes 
in Syracuse, for example, had so few friends capable of understanding, 
and so discussing, his work that he mostly communicated it by letters to 
a select handful in Samos and Alexandria. See Netz, The Works of Archi-
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medes, I (2004), p. 13, on Conon, Eratosthenes, and Dositheus. There are 
records from China by early mediaeval times showing letters perhaps 
playing a somewhat comparable role in Buddhism. See Zürcher, Buddhist 
Conquest, p. 226, on the letters from Huiyan to Kumârajîva. 
The fourth chapter, entitled ―Delusions of Invulnerability,‖ is on the 
effort by philosophers to find a consoling psychological defence, through 
metaphysics, against the evident weakness of human beings in the face of 
greater forces, both imagined, like the gods, and real, like diseases, natu-
ral disasters, and tyrants. Lloyd says that, unlike the majority of ancient 
Greeks, the ancient Chinese were not haunted by the fear of the envy or 
malice (phthonos) of the gods. True, but the early Chinese were at times 
afflicted by the fear that they were being punished by Heaven, typically 
by natural disasters, for some crime they had committed but of which 
they were unaware. An example is Ode 258 (Yun Han 雲  漢 ) in 
Karlgren‘s translation of the Book of Odes: ―Heaven sends down death 
and disorder, famine comes repeatedly; there are no spirits to which sac-
rifices are not made, we do not grudge those victims; … why does no 
[spirit] listen to us?‖ In later times the question of the justice of Heaven 
was not, perhaps, a common theme, but it was a persistent one. In the 
Chinese case this issue was also probably most often posed in collective 
terms, whereas the Greeks seem to have seen disaster more often as an 
individual matter, brought on by such conditions as excessive wealth or 
undeserved unbroken happiness. The familiar tale of Baucis and Phile-
mon (at least as retailed by Ovid, Metamorphoses VIII, 616-724) shows, 
however, that it was thought that divine punishment might also fall on 
impious communities (as Lloyd also notes later on page 116), and that the 
modest and pious were sometimes not the victims of phthonos, but the 
recipients of the gods‘ kindness. This is broadly in line with Hesiod, in 
spite of the grim picture he paints at times of human relations with the 
gods: on the whole Zeus rewarded the good, and punished the bad, 
though at times the evil of a single person or ruler might bring down 
vengeance on an entire community. See Works and Days, 225-247, 256-262. 
Lloyd gives an excellent account of the three main approaches taken 
to the achievement of ataraxia, a state of immutable internal tranquillity: 
the Epicurean, the Stoic, and the Sceptical. The first was based on 
achieving a clear-eyed understanding of the nature of the physical world, 
the second on internal self-cultivation to attain a virtue that conferred an 
unbreakable indifference to the normal temptations and terrors of human 
experience, and the third, though it came in a variety of forms, on the 
realization of the ultimate unprovability of any proposition (almost a 
kind of ancient Zen). What would have been fascinating here would have 
been the author‘s view on Bryant‘s suggestion in his Moral Codes and 
Social Structure in Ancient Greece (1996) that these were the result of the 
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individual‘s loss of virtually any power to determine his, and his 
community‘s, existence once the small-scaled world of the polis had been 
swept away by the great empires of Macedon and then Rome. (See the 
slightly different perspective adopted on p. 149.) 
The closest parallel in ancient China to these Hellenistic quests for ata-
raxia are to be found in the Zhuangzi, and if there is any real fault to be 
found with Lloyd‘s quick-witted and challenging book it is that he fails to 
come to terms with this complex layered text and the elusive thinker who 
inspired it, but in all probability did not write it, or much of it. Zhuangzi 
(if we may for a moment treat him as a person) was a past master at logic, 
who used logic to destroy logic, hence in a Chinese way a Sceptic. Meta-
physically, though, he was a sort of monist who saw the universe as con-
sisting of the endless sequences of the transformation of things (wuhua 物 
化), and release from delusion and anxiety as coming from the individu-
al‘s enlightened acceptance of his fate as a ever-varying participant in the 
ever-altering Great All. 
For those interested in the history of science, the relative dismissal in 
this chapter of the atomism and other ideas of the Epicureans (which 
most of us know best at second hand through Lucretius) is perhaps the 
key issue. Lloyd says on page 99 that ―they did not engage in the type of 
research in astronomy, optics, harmonics, geography and medicine that 
some of their contemporaries were undertaking.‖ This is both true in a 
literal sense (so far as we know from the patchy documentation) and yet, 
I would feel, at the same time a serious underestimation of their im-
portance. As Lucio Russo points out on page 23 of his The Forgotten Revo-
lution (2004) Epicurean explanation of phenomena by means of non-
observable entities was a crucial strategic step towards the construction 
of scientific theories; and, in addition, the idea of mechanistic determina-
tion seems to go back to Leucippus, and the distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities to Democritus. Lucretius was also first surviving 
author to state, and to justify in outline terms, the principle of the conser-
vation of mass (De rerum natura, II.294-296). It has rightly been pointed 
out (as by Barbour in The Discovery of Dynamics (2001), pp. 70-71) that 
there was a serious gap in ancient atomic theory, namely the absence of a 
precise explanation of how the atoms in general moved. I suspect, none-
theless, that there may be something valid in Serres‘ suggestion that the 
atomists‘ conception of motion was based on their attentive observation 
of the flow of water (La naissance de la physique dans le texte de Lucrèce—
fleuves et turbulences (1977), passim), even if many of his other remarks do 
not inspire much confidence. It was, however, largely from Lucretius via 
Gassendi (1592-1655) that the ultimately scientifically fruitful inspiration 
of ancient atomism entered early modern European physics. A more 
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detailed discussion of issues such as these would have been well worth 
having. 
The fifth chapter, on ―The Frailties of Justice,‖ shows that by the time 
of the empires the operation of a bureaucratically based legal system had 
tended in both cultures, from rather different starting-points, towards 
structures that were not radically dissimilar from each other. Lloyd also 
makes the point that, starting in the polis period, the increasing frequency 
with which new laws were made in the Greek world tended to under-
mine popular  faith in the ultimate as opposed to the contingent validity 
of the laws (p.119). The same was surely true of the pragmatic, and often 
drastic, legal innovations of the so-called ‗methods school‘ or ‗legalists‘ 
(fajia 法 家) in late pre-imperial China, though I don‘t think that this par-
ticular point is explicitly made. 
It is when the analysis moves on to conceptions that the issues become 
both more interesting and more difficult. Lloyd points out that the many-
meaninged terms dikê/dikaia and themis that we tend to think of as having 
a sense close to ‗justice‘ originally had the sense more of ‗locally ap-
proved customary usage‘. Though the material in the Analects was pre-
sumably at least in part selected to make a Confucian ideological point, 
the existence in ancient China of a somewhat analogous variegated situa-
tion is hinted at by the familiar story of the so-called ‗Duke‘ of She and 
Confucius, which Lloyd mentions on page 133. The ‗Duke‘ boasted that 
―in his community (dang 黨)‖ one of his subjects, ‗a certain Upright Gong‘ 
(直 躬 者) had borne witness against his own father for stealing a sheep. 
Confucius replied, ―In my community (dang 黨) the upright men are of 
quite another sort. A father will screen his son, and a son his father—
which incidentally does involve a sort of uprightness 直 在 其 中 矣.‖ 
(Analects, XIII.18, trad. Waley, adjuv. M. E.). In early imperial China, al-
ready more ideologically homogenized, there was a legally prescribed 
death penalty for sons accusing their fathers, as illustrated by the execu-
tion of Prince Shuang in 123 BC (Ch‘ü T‘ung-tsu, Law and Society in Tradi-
tional China (1961), p. 72), a penalty relaxed slightly only in late-imperial 
times if the accusation were proven true. This is a tentative suggestion, it 
should be added. Professor Lloyd uses the reference, quite validly, to 
indicate the Chinese concern with the differing legal rights and obliga-
tions of those in differing social roles. 
There is the usual trouble with some of the key Chinese terms, notably 
yi 義 traditionally translated, as here by the author, as ‗righteousness‘, 
and ren 仁 traditionally translated as ‗humaneness‘, as here, or ‗benevo-
lence‘. Never expect two sinologists to agree completely on how to ren-
der such words, so I will merely note here that I would argue, personally, 
that yi is above all a term indicating ‗an action or attitude that transcends 
particular links between kin and friends to focus on what essentially mat-
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ters to society as wider whole‘, and that ren is more accurately rendered 
as ‗a compassionate sensitive awareness of another person‘s state of mind 
or feeling‘ (as hinted at by one of the Han-dynasty meanings of its nega-
tive, buren 不 仁, namely ‗numb‘). 
Perhaps a more interesting question is, Did ancient China ever devel-
op any conception that approximated to the ancient Greek idea of ‗jus-
tice‘ in its more developed forms? More specifically, were China‘s domi-
nant ideas in this domain virtually all focussed exclusively on socio-
political system maintenance? The underlying defining metaphor, if one 
may so put it, seems to have been that the political-cultural system under 
a supreme ruler was like the constant rotation of the heavens, or as the 
ancient cliché expressed it Tianjing Diyi 天 經 地 義,  which roughly trans-
lates as something like ‗the constancy of Heaven and the public-
spiritedness of Earth‘ and usually glossed as indicating the immutability 
of ritually or morally correct behaviour (Cihai encyclopaedia (1947), 
p. 366). Put another way, translating the Latin tag fiat justitia ruat cælum, 
i.e. ‗let justice be done and [if need be] let Heaven fall,‖ into meaningful 
classical Chinese seems impossible. Under such assumptions the mainte-
nance of the system was, virtually by definition, superior to any other 
aim for any course of action. This then led to the classic Chinese conun-
drum, Did success in and of itself justify a change of the ruling or dynas-
ty, or, if not, what did?—The well-known question of the Mandate of 
Heaven. But this is not discussed. 
The sixth chapter is on ―Models for Living.‖ It has several striking 
aperçus, such as the contrast between, on the Greek side, the labours of 
Herakles and the technical contributions of Prometheus to humankind on 
the one hand, the former all of immense difficulty but of little social 
benefit, and the latter, though socially beneficial, rewarded by Zeus with 
the perpetually renewed torture of the disobedient donor, and, on the 
other hand on the Chinese side, a multi-millennial gratitude to the 
legendary or semi-legendary sage-kings whose wisdom and unflinching 
labours had bestowed on them houses, farming, flood control, and 
indeed writing and much else besides. But it is not clear if the main focus 
in the chapter is on what one should do, or on what one would be proud to 
have done if the opportunity presented itself and one was up to the 
occasion. In both cultures the answers to the first case were highly 
dependent on status, gender, and age. Thus in China, the most basic 
obligations were the proper observance of the relationships called the 
‗Three Net-ropes‘ (san‟gang 三 綱), the prescribed asymmetrical powers 
and duties between husbands and wives, fathers and sons, and older and 
elder brothers, a key point, even if not a very interesting one, but not 
mentioned by Lloyd. It was expressed in various didactic works of which 
the Xiaojing 孝 經, the Classic of Filial Piety, or, better, ‗obedience‘, is the 
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best-known. Though some Chinese virtues shifted slightly, that of loyalty 
(zhong 忠) seemingly changing from an early reciprocal relationship (in 
the Shujing 書 經 period) between leader and led to a classical and post-
classical unilateral obligation on the part of the inferior, in the Greek 
world, the desiderata were more varied, and changed more across time. I 
would instance Bryant‘s Moral Codes, already mentioned, as a good 
preliminary guide to the latter, not wishing to attempt an improvised 
summary here. As to doing the second—identifying the distinctive 
sources of well-deserved pride—it would require, again in both cultures, 
a re-reading of biographies, epitaphs, and funerary inscriptions subtle 
enough, where necessary, to distinguish between real motivation, 
publicly declared motivation, and posthumously attributed motivation—
if this is not an impossible demand. As is well known, Aeschylus‘s 
gravestone inscription spoke only of his military service at Marathon and 
by implication elsewhere (he was also at Salamis), but later memorial 
poems do not mention it, and tend instead to concentrate on the plays 
(Loeb: Aeschylus I, xxii-xxiii; Gr. Anthology II, #39 and #411, but not #40). 
In sum, Delusions of Invulnerability is a remarkably rich little book  for 
its scant 164 pages of text, and raises many interesting questions in new 
forms. The answers are drawn from a depth of learning that most of 
us can only envy and admire; and with some brilliant one-liners. 
Above all it should prove an invigorating stimulus for those who wish to 
approach these subjects from a fresh perspective. If it has any limitations, 
it is that―perhaps understandably, given its restricted format relative to 
the the wide domain that it surveys―a handful of the analyses are at best 
suggestive rather than carried through to demonstrated conclusions.1 
 
 
                                                          
1 I should like to thank Professor Hans Ulrich Vogel and Professor Joseph 
Bryant most warmly for their enriching comments on the first draft of this re-
view. 
